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THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND AND 
ITS HISTORIANS 1 
 
I 
FOR many historians with no particular expertise in the matter, the doctrines of  
The  Law  rather  resemble  an  impressive  range  of mountains. They loom 
over the social landscape in every period of the past in which historians labour, 
and they are undeniably im- portant. The Law Mountains are said (by those 
who claim to know) profoundly to affect the intellectual climate of an age. The 
frontier between state and civil society apparently runs somewhere along the line 
of their peaks. Finally, one of the recognised professional duties of historians is 
to track every movement of a tiny g10up of very important people. A 
surprising number turn out to be lawyers, often from an elite climbing club called 
The Bar. Many of these men have achieved, in past centuries, a spectacular 
degree of upward mobility (itself  of  interest  to  historians)  through  mastering  
the  peculiar techniques necessary to scale the slopes of the Law Mountains. We 
watch in astonishment, from the ground, as our subjects make their way up one 
or another commanding height of Law (and equally, of social station). 
But for most historians, that is about as close as we get. We do not know 
much about the mountains, even less how to climb them ourselves. 
Occasionally one of us will try to track the route of one of those lawyer-
mountaineers whom we usually watch from the ground. It quickly becomes 
apparent that even a short walk in the Law Mountains may require an intense, if 
improvised, course in technique.2 And to ·get to the objective quickly (the 
imperative for all legal climbers) one cannot linger en route to ponder the origin 
of the range, or to wonder at curious rock formations and admire the goats. 
But that is what the historian will want to do: understand the origins of the 
mountains, their stratification, the forces that shaped them-and, incidentally, to 
admire the goats. If practising lawyers are competitive climbers at heart, most 
historians are contemplative geologists. 
Historians tell a modern fable about the Law Mountains. It concerns an 
historian-geologist who asked a lawyer-climber what he knew about them. The 
lawyer's answer was (of course), "Because they are there."3 "But," persisted the 
historian, "how did they get there? Why are some aspects so precipitous, others 
so gentle? What's inside the Law Mountains?" The lawyer missed the point. 
"We have manuals that show all the feasible routes, graded according to difficulty. 
(Indeed, even each assault by members of The Bar is assessed by our most 
distinguished older members.) And our Mait- land Club (few of whom actually 
climb the Mountains) can show you reports on the main routes from past 
centuries, and incidentally relate some marvellous tales about great men like 
Coke and Mansfield who pioneered some of the best ones. Things have changed a 
lot recently. Fellow-Servant Chimney, very popular in the nine- teenth century, 
is now impassable. And a whole party was lost in 1924, in a rockslide started 
by a silly beggar named Campbell. It quite changed this face of Old Felony."4 
The historian, perhaps unwisely, stopped listening, and many decades ago 
organised his fellows to tackle the Law Mountains in a less sporting way. We are 
tunnelling. The computerised MOLE5 chews through parchment-paper 
conglomerates like butter, and Old Felony in particular, which is not much 
bigger than Snowdon, will be thoroughly honeycombed in the next 50 years or 
so.6 As the archives are sounded, the patterns found in the records of the 
hundreds of thousands of past cases for which records survive have called forth 
two kinds of explanations which, although related, deal with issues of different 
scale. 
The first group of tentative explanations concerns the relationship between  the 
surfce prominencesof doctrine and the vast bulk of actual litigation decided in 
the past. It runs two ways. In one direction, how far can doctrinal developments 
be explained in terms of practical imperatives presented in repeated instances 
before the courts, rather than simply by an evolution of earlier doctrine? In the 
other, how far are peculiarities of structure in the mass of litigation explicable 
by purely legal imperatives, whether of doctrine or administration? The detailed 
research  into the  mass of  past  cases has also generated a second group of 
explanations, directed to answering rather different questions. To continue the 
metaphor briefly before abandoning it: what relationship do the Law Mountains 
bear to theories of plate tectonics? What wider, converging social forces 
(imperatives of the state, religious belief, purposes of different classes) threw up 
these heaps of parchment and paper, made litigation so much more voluminous 
in some eras than others, and gave it distinctive structures? For as we tunnel 
through we find remarkable changes in the origins of cases, in their incidence, 
and in their disposition, even within the last few centuries.  In  recent years those 
patterns have been much considered by historians interested in both wider 
social forces and the law. 
What follows is not a review of that literature, but an attempt to explain 
(with a few examples) what some historians are about. The examples are taken 
from the criminal law in the period 1750-1850, and from prosecution in 
particular, because that is what I know best, and also because Old Felony (and  its 
twin  peak  Misdemeanour) have been disproportionately the site  of work by 
historians, like myself, who are not lawyers.7 If I emphasise questions or sources 
which are less familiar to lawyers, and perhaps also to some historians whose main 
concern is with doctrine, there is a reason. It is to suggest, first, that the new 
social and intellectual history of the law is not irrelevant to doctrine-rather the 
opposite. Secondly, some of the larger hypotheses-those about plate tectonics-are 
of central importance for any intellectually respectable understan9ing of law 
itself, and prompt some reflections about why lawyers and historians may have 
such different views of the Mountains. 
 
II 
When Sir James Fitzjames Stephen wrote his History of the Crb.ninal Law of 
England (1883) he based his account of trials on the highly atypical State Trials: 
atypical because they often concerned treason (with different procedural rules 
from felony), committed very often by powerful people, and tried in 
circumstances in which counsel, judges, and prisoners felt heavy  pressure from 
government. Until recently we had little sense of the evolution of the ordinary 
criminal trial from the time of Sir George Jeffries (not to speak of the dark ages 
before that) until well into the nineteenth century. By greatly expanding the 
scope of research to printed records of more ordinary criminal trials, and through 
exploring the manuscript records of the courts and the private papers of J.P.s 
and others, not only the trial but also the preliminaries to indictment are 
becoming much better understood. Much is still contentious, but some things are 
clear. The ole of the private prosecutor was overwhelmingly important in practice 
as well as in theory until well into the nineteenth century, even after the 
introduction of the "new" police in some areas. Private Associations for the 
Prosecution of Felons were extremely widespread , numbering perhaps 1,000 in 
the country as a whole by the mid-nineteenth century, although they seem to 
have been of particular interest to manufacturers and tradesmen, especially in the 
period of their first rapid growth in the eighteenth century. Discretion in framing 
the charge seems to have been widely extended to prosecutors, without much 
interference by justices in spite of the Marian committal statutes. Eighteenth-
century trials are shown to have been extremely rapid by modern standards-10 or 
20 serious fe.lonies in a day at times, with verdicts returned quickly by 
experienced jurymen who worked closely with very active judges, a necessity 
when so few criminal cases (apart from poaching and a few other offences of 
largely rural significance) were heard summarily. Moreover, the eighteenth-
century trial revolved to a great extent around assessments of character. The 
subsequent growth of a body of evidentiary rules, almost certainly the direct 
result of the growth of a defence bar, had significantly changed the nature of 
the jury trial by the early nineteenth century. A necessarily congruent 
development, given the enormous increase in indictable offences  from 1815 (and 
probably the increasing time taken by a trial), was the eventual extension of 
summary hearings on a very wide scale. From being the epitome of English 
criminal law in the eighteenth century, the jury trial became the little-used 
symbol of it in the nineteenth. 
The role of juries changed too. In the eighteenth century, petty jury verdicts 
(and prosecutorial activity) underwent significant shifts in response to wider 
economic conditions and associated changes in the character of crime. Moreover, 
longer-term changes in the structure of punishments during  the  period in which 
the main capital statutes were repealed in the early nineteenth century, and the 
increasing participation of police and stipendiary magistrates in the period 1750 to 
1850, greatly increased the conviction rate (from 50 to 80 per cent.) and reduced 
the incidence of committals not resulting in trial (from 20 to 10 per cent.). 
Finally, many of the innovations effected through legislation, such as the Trials 
for Felony Act (1836) and Sir John Jervis's Act regulating preliminary 
proceedings (1848)8 now appear to be legislative endorsements of longer-term 
developments rather  than unexampled innovations. They also appear, like so 
many other changes in criminal law in the early nineteenth century (and contrasting 
with its stasis in the eighteenth) to be intimately involved in party differences 
and wider concerns in English society. Thus the 1836 Act eventuated in part from 
long debates about the humanity and justice of English law, including the 
argument about capital punishment. The 1848 Act in part reflected widespread 
criticism, professional and political, of the  rural  Tory  lay bench. Both Acts also 
undoubtedly reached the statute book partly as a result of a phenomenal increase 
in the size of the legal profession, in the 1830s and 1840s. A great increase in 
legal journalism, often critical of the status quo, and expressive of a desire to 
introduce the values of self-conscious professionalism to every aspect of 
prosecution and trial, had much influence on Parliament. 
The greatest changes in prosecution practice occurred in the period between 
1815 and the mid-1850s, when  there was both the most spectacular increase in 
prosecution levels since the seventeenth century, and the sharpest expression of 
social division in English society since the same period. Both made the wider 
connotations of criminal law, particularly in the eyes of a nascent working class, 
of prime concern to the classes represented in Parliament and on the bench. And 
throughout the period, many significant changes in substantive law and practice 
were conditioned in large part by the sheer pressure  of numbers on the 
administrative machinery of justice, whether during the interruption of 
transportation during the American revolutionary war, peace-time explosions of 
indictment levels, or the rapid secular rise in prosecutions in the first part of the 
nineteenth century. By the 1860s, in contrast, a long secular decline in 
prosecution levels to the end of the century settled the main outlines of Victorian 
criminal justice as solidly as the walls of the new prisons and the newly 
respectable image of the British bobby. 
If changes in the law were closely connected with the incidence of prosecution, 
both were shaped by much wider social forces. We are led, in other words, from 
a consideration of the reciprocal relationships of doctrine and litigation to a 
consideration of English society in this period. Not all accounts of the history of 
prosecution, or of the law and' crime in general, attempt to describe those larger 
dimensions of the context of law. I think it essential to do so. A history which 
does not inquire  behind the legal process leads too easily to the doubtful 
generalization that attitudes to crime,  and hence to much of the law, have 
changed little if at all for centuries. One of the largest  questions concerns the 
different meanings that the criminal law has for the different classes making up 
the social order, differing interpretations that obtained in even those periods 
when stability rather than rapid change seemed to characterise the criminal law. 
 
III 
Many historians and other scholars have implicitly described the legitimacy and 
authority of the criminal law as largely unproblematic. To use Stanley Diamond's 
dichotomy (advanced in a wider argument), this explanation (what I shall call 
Argument A), portrays law as a double institutionalisation of customary or 
popular norms, a replication of pre-existing or consubstantial social values, with 
per- haps a few awkward gaps between the law on the books and social practice 
and belief.9 Where gaps exist, they are successively elimi- nated through 
"reform." One suspects that for many English writers, this has been especially 
true of England. Although the process is never quite complete, the criminal law, 
according to Radzinowicz, "has always aeen sensitive to the needs and aspirations 
of the English people, and it has continuously changed under the impact of the 
predominant opinion of the day."10 Very few have been inclined to suggest (as 
did Diamond himself in Argument B) that in many societies state law instead is 
the imposition of a conquering class or a ruling class on a population that either 
formerly enjoyed its own customary law, or continued to adhere to customary 
mores as long as it could. In either of the latter cases state law is an 
imposition, but a progressively more powerful one, that cannibalises custom, 
remaking it and redefining it (when not obliterating it) in the process. More 
recently, Lenman and Parker have argued that something like this happened in 
Western Europe, including England, over the last thousand years. 11 
The problem with both these views of the criminal law, even if applied only 
to two centuries, is not simply that they are very large arguments about law for 
which different historians will  advance many different standards of proof, 
kinds of evidence, chronologies. It is that they are very large arguments 
about not only what was law, but also about its relation to social belief and 
practice through whole societies over extended periods of time. And the 
empirical evidence that should be brought to bear to test such 
generalisations, even for the criminal law alone, does not lie easily to 
hand. Not only were large parts of the population, including those most 
subject to prosecutions, not much given to publishing or otherwise 
recording their thoughts (a problem  acknowledged by all historians). There 
is also the problem that those who did write for posterity (the enlightened 
agents of legal change in the first view, the imposers of law in the second) 
left far from unproblematic comments. In dealing with such a highly political 
issue as law, one so charged with generating and enforcing moral meanings, 
one so crucial (or so they believed) to the existing social order, they usually 
gave a limited range of answers about the purposes of the criminal law and 
admitted to the existence of only a limited range of questions. To frustrate 
us further, they often, perhaps usually, were not conscious of the fact that 
they thought within such limits, precisely because they did so. 
The result is that beliefs about law in different social classes, and the way 
those beliefs entered into the relations between those able to create and use law 
and those largely excluded from c!oing so, are very difficult to recover. It is easy 
but highly misleading to construct a version of the first side of Diamond's 
dichotomy (A: "law expresses social norms") by relying on an imputation of 
motive and belief (usually borrowed from literate contemporaries, or the political 
prejudices of the historian) to the great majority of the population for whom 
evidence is sparse. And it is easy but highly misleading to construct a version of 
the second argument (B: "ruling classes impose law") by simply citing substantive 
criminal law without showing how it was used, or what personal, class and 
societal needs it met or failed to meet. 
When we turn to eighteenth-century England, we find widespread popular 
beliefs that certain customs were the embodiment of legality (in rights over land, 
in artisanal practice, in wage payment, in the organisation of marketing 
foodstuffs). All were increasingly under pressure from the law of the state but 
by no means dead. Parts of state law in all these areas (but always in particular 
instances) moved from ·a partial recognition of some custom, often through 
increasingly narrow judicial definition, to legislative extinction. Often this evo- 
lution met with strong popular resistance, in particular cases, at particular times.  
One must start, I think, with the assumption that state law and popular belief 
shared important areas of  agreement but also important areas of disagreement, 
and try to chart both. And because those conflicts so often surfaced in the 
criminal law (for reasons to which I shall return) any account that hopes to 
explain the history  of  doctrine  or administration  cannot  ignore  the social 
beliefs and practices that surrounded the law in action. 
Broadly, there have been a number of paths by which historians have tried 
to approach the relationship between state law and the belief of different classes. 
Three seem to me to be the most important. One has been to examine the 
records of the courts statistically to find out who was in fact using the law, for 
what ends, and to what extent. A second has been to study legal proceedings 
for their wider social meanings for the class that administered the law, and in 
particular to illuminate the means by which an often intuitive but sometimes 
overtly conscious orchestration of legal proceedings was addressed to popular 
perceptions in the inculcation of a common standard of justice. A third has been 
to try to reconstruct popular attitudes to particular practices on which state law 
had (or developed) other definitions, and their reciprocal influences. At many 
points in the development of criminal law and prosecution over this period of two 
or three centuries, changes will only be fully understood when all three are taken 
into account. 
The most striking first finding from statistical analysis of prosecutions is that 
for much of this period the total level of activity was very low indeed. 
Although the court records surviving from the eighteenth century are voluminous 
enough to present research problems, it appears that rates of prosecution were 
markedly lower than in either the seventeenth or the nineteenth centuries. 
Clearly, most Englishmen and women took their disputes to fora other than the 
courts of the state. In minor civil cases they had a network of local courts (still 
little understood), including courts of requests, in which lay adjudicators could 
dispense with most of the procedural problems of the common law. And in both 
civil and criminal matters they frequently had recourse to other laymen. One such 
man, a Quaker, recorded in the autobiography he wrote for his family that in 
over 40 years there had been ho formal litigation in his parish, but that he had 
settled over 600 disputes. We occasionally find scattered references to other 
occasions when Justices of the Peace, whose mediating role in misdemeanours 
was well established, exacted public apologies, sometimes on their knees, from 
transgres- sors whom the community condemned. Where popular condemna- 
tion was less likely (as in game cases) extorted apologies were more likely to be 
printed in the press. One tentative conclusion, then, is that particularly in the 
eighteenth  century, the costs, uncertainties (given the acquittal rate) and 
punishments of the criminal law encouraged even more of an abstention from 
state law than in other periods. 
The statistical examination of past criminal prosecutions has also shown, in 
some areas of the country in the eighteenth century, and in national totals for 
the nineteenth, that prosecutions for theft (the greatest part of crime) were 
closely related to larger economic changes, notably the rapid price changes for 
foodstuffs that were the consequence of dearth, and the effects on employment of 
export markets, the trade cycle, wars, conscription, and the massive 
demobilisation of troops. Each of these has been given much greater specificity 
than before, and one general conclusion that emerges is that the pressure of 
poverty can be more closely related to the incidence of crime than was 
suggested in early studies, flawed by considering too few of several 
simultaneously operating causes. In some periods, however short, it seems likely 
that large proportions of the labouring poor experienced both sudden destitution, 
and a suddenly increased possibility of feeling the direct effects of the criminal 
law. A dissensus of popular norms and law seems a likely result. Against such 
evidence can be constructed a "legitimacy index" based on the social class of 
prosecutors. Although historians disagree on the reliability of the  sources, and on 
the meaning of the raw figures, as many as a fifth in theft cases in both the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were what were called "the labouring poor" 
in the earlier period, "working men, operatives and labourers" in the later. 
They were underrepresented as prosecutors, however, com- pared to other 
classes, and  much  commonly  appeared in court as defendants. The significance 
of their use of the criminal law, whether as an instrumental recourse for the 
recovery of stolen goods,  the mounting of vexatious proceedings, or for other 
ends, will not be adequately knowri until the sociology of more cases is also 
known to us. 
An  important  issue  in  the  nineteenth  century  is whether  more working-class 
complainants had recourse to the courts as prosecution increasingly fell into the 
hands of the police. The difficulty of disentangling the actions of complainants 
from the actions of the police (who in the first half of the nineteenth century were 
accused of fomenting many vexatious and malicious prosecutions in some 
jurisdictions) has yet to be resolved. Our findings about the role of the police in 
prosecutions in the nineteenth century are still, surprisingly, not very far 
advanced. Surprising, because there is a new and extensive literature on police 
organisation, on the creation of new forces between 1829 and the 1850s, and on 
popular  responses to them. There are important differences in response: a smooth 
transition from  the old parish constabulary in some areas, violent working-class 
resistnce in others, especially in the north of England, where it was believed (as 
was the case) that the new police were meant to implement the harsh aims of the 
Poor Law Amendment Act ·of 1834. There are temporal changes as well, 
including a recurrence of violence against the police in the 1860s and 1870s, 
probably due to the use of constables in  deterring  applicants  for poor relief, and 
in tightening up licensing hours. In the early 1870s it was estimated that every 
Metropolitan police officer would on average be injured once every two years. 
The statistics,  then,  are suggestive  rather  than  conclusive  about popular 
beliefs as reflected  in use of the criminal law, both in the eighteenth century  and 
in the nineteenth. The figures may, in the end, tell us more about middle-class 
fears: analysis of such "moral panics" as the "garrotting" episode of the early 1860s 
shows the way in which police responsiveness to Press opinion could readily yield 
an "increase" in serious crime. Some of the other, larger purposes which 
wealthier citizens saw in the criminal law can be tracked more easily in other 
sources. 
One strongly-held belief was that private prosecution was an essential 
constitutional safeguard against possible executive tyranny, a belief which served 
to preserve in England the right of prosecution relatively unimpaired into the 
twentieth century.. It is also clear that those with property and those who 
administered the criminal law thought the courts most important for the 
inculcation of moral values, and a belief in English justice, in a working-class 
which they did not trust. In part this was to be done through attention to the 
theatre of justice. A judge at all sensitive to the social importance of law is 
likely to be acutely aware of this aspect of his work. Lord Devlin gave a modern 
expression of it: 
"The social service which the judge renders to the community is the 
removal of a sense of injustice. To perform this service the essential 
quality which he needs is impartiality and  next after that the appearance of 
impartiality. I put impartiality before the appearance of it simply because 
without the reality the api:earance would not endure. In truth, within the 
context of service to the community the appearance is the more important of  
the two."12 
 
That concern with sensitive vulgarisation of professional learning has its own 
history. The judicial attention to appearance, especially in acting as counsel for 
the undefended prisoner in this period, in pronouncing sentence of death, and in 
making proclamations of the justice and mercy of state law, are.of central interest 
to the historian trying to gauge popular responses to the courts. A detailed 
history of prosecution is important here, particularly for noting contexts of social 
distress or widespread riot. 1 The chronology of the transition from the bullying 
which appears often to have been characteristic of the seventeenth-century bench, 
to the widely remarked benevolent neutrality of the Hanoverian and Victorian 
judiciary, is another aspect of the history of legal theatre. We must also  look to 
the increasing disposition of cases to lay magistrates in the early nineteenth 
century, a process which some contemporaries, in the troubled 1830s and 1840s, 
believed greatly weakened working-class respect for state courts because of the 
casual moral brutality (literally Dickensian) characterising part of the lay bench. 
Many stipendiaries, on the other hand, appear to have  been  acutely  aware  that  
they were attempting to rebuild respect for the law, and some went so far as to 
pretend a civil jurisdiction they did not possess, in order to overawe oppressive 
landlords or employers late with wages. In those areas of the country in which 
they also committed hundreds of workmen to prison in master and servant 
prosecutions, their success was still greater than when justices  in the trade did 
so. 
While the detailed symbolic histories of magistrates' courts  are difficult to 
recover  (although much work is being done), we know more about the 
importance attributed by upper-class opinion in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries to the assizes and to their use of the death penalty.  The 
repeal  of  capital  punishment, often explained in terms of a disembodied 
humanitarianism (expressed in parliamentary debates and in the tenderness of 
juries and of prosecutors), now appears to have had more to do with developments 
in doctrinal thinking on the one hand, and overt political considerations, closely 
tied to a class analysis of English society, on the other. In doctrine, the rise of 
formalism in important areas of private law, remarked by historians on both sides 
of the Atlantic, was also part of the attack on the discretion  which  the judges 
increasingly had to exercise in selecting a few unfortunates among the 
condemned for actual execution, as death sentences increased with indictable 
crime but executions clearly could not. It seemed increasingly unacceptable to 
reformers like Romilly that no known rules, certainly no rules of law, governed 
the exercise of the pardon, when criminal  procedure and a rapidly expanding law 
of evidence were observed rigorously in capital trials. The larger political 
conflict, as it is analysed in a recent account of the parliamentary debates on the 
capital statutes, was between two conceptions of proper authority, matching two 
distinct views of the dynamics of English society. 14 On the one hand, Tories 
committed to the status quo of the eighteenth-century system deplored attacks on 
the capital statutes, which they argued were essential for making discriminating 
use of the necessary terror of the law. On the other hand, their opponents (and 
for the most part, the political opposition in Parliament) castigated the erratic 
operation of the Royal Pardon, particularly under the Prince Regent, as a symbol 
of the arbitrary nature of aristocratic government. They also warned that far 
from holding a potentially revolutionary working class in awe, capital punishment 
would harden the moral sentiments of those already depraved: the state" which 
murdered, and so publicly, could expect little allegiance in return. Many of 
those arguments were recapitulated, briefly, in the debates which led to the 
effective end of public executions in the 1860's. 
Finally, some of the most interesting work on the relationship of criminal law 
and social beliefs has centred on instances of direct comparisons or reciprocal 
influences between state law and popular justice. We know relatively little about 
such ties, but they were ubiquitous. One cause was the degree to which the high 
visibility of state justice (from the distant past) permeated popular culture as an 
exemplar of the way of doing justice. Some popular justice notably the rituals of 
"rough music"-appears to have remained relatively untouched in form until they 
died  out  in  the nineteenth  century. The most striking opposite case, the elaborate 
aping of state criminal procedure, took place among groups contaminated by  very 
direct contact with the courts-prisoners holding mock trials in gaols, barristers 
doing the same in their circuit messes. But other reciprocal influences or 
similarities between state law and extra-legal social enforcement are more 
interesting. When judges and legislators ceased to believe in the maleficium of 
witchcraft in the early eighteenth century, and repealed the capital statutes on 
the subject in 1736, their unexampled mercy did not impress a large number of 
villagers, who in many incidents in the next half-century continued to 
interrogate and punish suspected witches by dragging  them through ponds (with 
murder charges by the state sometimes the result). On the other hand, the quick 
justice of  the crowd against thieves caught red-handed, usually through ducking in 
a horse-trough, appears rather similar to the very rapid assessment of character 
and guilt which we now know was the norm in the courts, even in trials on capital 
statutes. Finally, a most interesting example of the complex relationship between 
state law and popular beliefs about law, or popular justice, is that of the food riot. 
It is interesting in part because it is now one of the best-studied aspects of 
eighteenth-century popular culture. And the evidence from many hundreds of 
instances shows that crowd action against bakers and millers suspected of 
profiting from high food prices was informed by a belief that seizing food and 
selling it for a "just" price,  or punishing the offender more directly, was 
legitimated by a long tradition of legal sanctions against such suspected exploiters of 
the community. Magistrates as well as mobs agreed on the value of Tudor and 
Stuart (and earlier) legislation against middle- men in food enacted to prevent· 
popular disorder of threatening proportions in times of dearth. 15 
It is worth pursuing this example a little further, as an illustration of the 
differences between social history of law and more doctrinal legal history, even  
when the  latter is written by a lawyer highly sensitive to the need for 
contextual study of the legal past. It may also illustrate my contention that 
much doctrine may be explicable only by following litigation to its sources. 
In The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford, 1979) Patrick Atiyah i.s 
concerned to construct an argument that judges, in the course of the later 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, sheared equitable protection  from the 
law of contract. They moved from a tradition that sometimes interfered with  
agreements  that were (or had become through circumstances) inequitable to 
almost invariable insistence on the execution of the expressed intentions of the 
parties, however imbalanced the respective benefits. In making this case he 
draws on a wide range of  evidence of  changes in administration, attitudes 
to legislation, but above all the developing ideology of a market of freely 
contracting individuals, responsible for their actions, understood in the terms 
of early classical political economy. There are problems with the narrative, 
however, when judges behave in ways "difficult to interpret from an 
economic viewpoint." One such hiccup in the judicial imbibing of free market 
principles  appears to  be  the  decision  of  Lord  Kenyon  and  his brothers in 
R. v. Rusby and R. v. Waddington, in 180{}-1801.16 In those cases they 
emphasised that the common law crimes of buying and reselling foodstuffs for 
gain or in speculative quantities, or before they came to open market 
(engrossing, regrating, forestalling) . still remained  after the repeal of many 
of the statutes in 1772. 17 Moreover,  Justices  Kenyon  and  Grose  not  only 
repudiated  the theories of political economy presented by counsel for the 
defend- ants: they also invoked older equitable notions (and Christianity, no 
less). In Rusby, Lord Kenyon said, 
"It frequently becomes the duty of juries in this place to decide causes 
where the interests of individuals are deeply concerned; but a more 
important duty than is imposed on them today they never fulfilled: this 
cause presents itself to their notice on behalf of all ranks, rich and poor, but 
more especially the latter. Though in a state of society  some must have 
greater luxuries and comforts than others, yet all should have the 
necessaries of life; and if the poor cannot exist, in vain may the rich look 
for happiness or prosperity. The Legislature is never so well employed as 
when they look to the interests of those who are at a distance from them 
in the ranks of society. It is their duty to do so: religion calls for it; 
humanity calls for it; and if there are hearts who are not awake to either 
of those feelings, their own interests would dictate it. The law has not 
been disputed; for though in an evil hour all the statutes which had been 
existing about a century were at one blow repealed, yet, thank God,  the 
provisions  of  the common  law  [against forestalling], were not destroyed . . 
. Speculation has said that  the  fear of such an offence is ridiculous; and a 
very learned man, a good writer, has said you might as well fear 
witchcraft. I wish Dr. Adam Smith had lived to hear the evidence of 
today, and then he would have seen whether such an offence exists, and 
whether it is to be dreaded. If he had been told that cattle and corn were 
brought to market, and then bought by a man whose purse happened to be 
lo!J.ger than his neighbours, so that the poor man who walks the street and 
earns his daily bread by his daily labour could get none but through his 
hands, and at the price he chose to demand; that  it had been  raised 3d., 
6d., 9d., ls., 2s., and more a quarter on the same day, would he have said 
there was no danger from such an offence?"18 
And in Waddington, where the prisoner was a large dealer in hops (held to be 
foodstuffs because they were essential to brewing), Kenyon declared that 
engrossing large quantities, in hopes of an exorbitant profit, "is a most heinous 
offence against religion and morality, and against the established law of the 
country." 19 
For Atiyah, this is a paradoxical survival of an older tradition of benevolent  
paternalism,  especially  since  Parliament  had  repealed the statutory provisions 
almost 30 years before.20  (It was a paradox that had surfaced before 1800: 
Kenyon had taken the opportunity in a case in 1795 to remark that the common 
law was still in effect.) Atiyah concludes, not unreasonably, that judges often 
get their law, and their prejudices, fixed at an early age, and suggests that 
Kenyon (who left the bench in 1802 after a long career) was simply behind the  
times,  uninstructed  in  the  truths  advanced  by  the  epigoni  of Adam Smith 
(who indeed had compared the laws against forestalling to those against 
witchcraft). 21  But the judgments,  and particularly Waddington, involved more 
than political economy and paternalism. Atiyah remarks that that context was 
one of "acute shortage and high prices" for foodstuffs.22  It was indeed a crisis. 
Food prices in 1800 and  1801 were  far  higher  than  they  had  been  during  
other periods  of  dearth:  from  early  1799 when  wheat  was  about  6s.  a bushel 
it had increased 300 per cent. to over a pound  a bushel  in March 1801 in 
most parts of the country. Vertiginously high prices were sustained throughout  
1800 and 1801. Since bread made up so much of the average diet, a large part 
of the population was made · destitute: no less than 40 per cent. of the 
population could not have bought, unassisted, enough bread to survive even if 
they had spent their entire family incomes on bread alone for the whole of 
1801.23 But it was a crisis not only for the poor. Food riots were widespread 
throughout the country, with the mob demanding that the authorities enforce the 
common law penalties against speculators in foodstuffs, in  the  belief  that  they  
were  largely  responsible  for  the  dearth. Thousands  of  troops,  by  early  1801, 
faced hostile  crowds who  in some districts  conducted  a virtual  guerrilla  
warfare  against  them. 
Justices of the peace were hastening to make scores of exemplary prosecutions 
of middlemen in food, and doing so in the most public manner, in order to 
restore order. And the magistrates were acutely aware (as was the government) 
that some of the troops were also disaffected, and that some food riots were 
accompanied by seditious calls  to  emulate  the  French  (with  whom  Britain  
was  at war)  by establishing  a  revolutionary  republic  in  England.  It  was  in  
these circumstances, when the discretionary  use of the laws against fore- 
stallers, regrators and engrossers of food was being heavily exploited as almost 
the only effective response to massive riot, that Wadding- ton's  counsel  
suggested  to King's  Bench  that  they  reflected  mere superstition, and pressed 
on the court the wisdom of Adam Smith. It is perhaps not surprising that the 
judges  preferred  the (rediscovered) wisdom of the common law, and in their 
judgments  used the rhetoric of Christianity and humanity, rather than that of the 
market. But the perspective  of the judges  was a more personal one than that,  
and  again  it  was  imposed  on  their  consciousness  by  events beyond  doctrine 
and beyond  general currents of  economic theory. In sentencing Waddington  to 
a large fine and imprisonment,  Grose J. argued that the laws against 
speculation in foodstuff were not an unwarranted interference with trade in the 
light of other facts: "In support of the legal freedom of trade [he said] the law 
has declared, and that law has repeatedly been acted upon, that to violate the 
freedom of trade by intercepting commodities on their way. to market, taking 
them from the owner by force . . . or obliging them to accept a less price than 
he demands, is a capital offence, for which men have forfeited  their lives to the 
law."24  Women too had been sentenced to death for food riots, which is what 
Grose was describing, and he and his brethren had pronounced numbers of such 
sentences, some of them carried out, in 1783, 1795, and 1800. If freedom of trade 
had been enforced with such rigour, it seemed reasonable that it also should have 
legal limits to prevent such tragedies. Grose and the other judges were 
conscious that if riots could be prevented by prosecuting forestallers and 
regrators and engrossers, fewer rioters would have to hang. Most important of 
all, they were also aware that in the extremely disturbed circumstances of 1801, 
the option of exemplary executions was increasingly fore- closed to them 
because hangings could provoke more riots than they prevented. Five years 
later, when prices had temporarily declined, the judges were showing much 
less hostility to engrossers, and by 1819, when the post-war depression had 
caused a great and pro- longed fall in agricultural prices (and when France was 
defeated), it was the opinion of the best lawyers that the courts would no longer 
enforce the common law penalties against middlemen in food without proof of 
specific intent to raise prices. 
Waddington and Rusby illustrate the value-breeding, ideological functions of 
the judges, and their sense of the policy requirements of the criminal law, as 
much as their traditionalism or their benevolence. Such policy considerations 
permeated the administration of the criminal law, and, in this instance, perhaps 
shaped (for a brief time) its doctrine. And those considerations rested, in this 
instance, on the consciousness that a radically different view, both of what 
was just  and  what  was  law,  was  held  by  the  labouring  poor.  In 1800-1801, 
they  demanded  that  the  courts  respond  to their  belief that the law of England 
had been properly embodied in that mass of legislation which Parliament had 
repealed in 1772. Faced with riot, distress,  and  the  threat  of  revolution,  the 
judges  responded. 25  In elucidating such cases we must  reconstruct  not only 
the doctrinal history and the wider intellectual currents .of the age, not only the 
class perceptions of the bench and the differences between judges, but  also  the  
larger  histories  of  actual  litigation  and  wider  social context. Only then will 
we illuminate the policy considerations and prejudices which are referred to so 
fleetingly in the reported cases, if at all, and be able to judge the relative 
autonomy of doctrine from economic theories, class strategies, and imperatives 
of government. I have been able to use this example because Atiyah's account 
of contract is so rich in references to wider influences on doctrine, and because 
the food riot has attracted much research.  On many other points  the  young  
disciplines  of  social  and  economic  history  still provide little commentary, in 
part because historians have been so ignorant of the chronology of legal 
change. Conversely, when some scholars come to prove the autonomy (or 
otherwise) of doctrine in the  past,  too  often  they  have  attempted  to  do so in  
a peculiarly unconvincing way. Detailed and informed work on fine distinctions 
of doctrine is placed  against highly schematic, impressionistic versions of 
social, economic, and political "background," derived from secondary sources 
which  are both  dated and general. The connections  between   law  and  
"context"  are  then   remarked--or,   more commonly, their absence noted, which 
one sometimes suspects was the interest of the enterprise. But no historian  
believes that causal relations work in such general ways, or that there is any 
interest in · trying to show that they do. Without examining the specific mech- 
anisms  at  the  point  of  decision,  and  without  knowing  what  the predicted, 
perceived  and intended ends of many decisions (perhaps at a low level  of  
consciousness)  actually  were,  nothing has been demonstrated.  In short, in 
history  there is no "background." There are only a host of forces of different 
strengths, including the beliefs of different social groups, the effects of which 
must be weighed in each case, and in the aggregate over time. 
 
IV 
I began with an image of the different perspectives of the lawyer and the 
historian to the legal past, that of the climber and the geologist. Their sources and 
their purposes differ greatly: in the case of the lawyer, a thin layer (particularly 
in England) of doctrinal materials used for immediately instrumental ends; for the 
historian, all surviving records of litigation, which are being searched for 
temporal and structural patterns of past law. And that is but the beginning, as 
some of my examples will have made clear. For historians, there can be no 
privileged sources, because few questions of any wide significance can be 
answered from materials, such as reports of cases, constructed for limited and 
specific ends.26 Social historians in particular  have taken their remit to be a 
wide one: explaining the beliefs and actions of not only legislators, judges, and the 
police, but of victims of crime, prosecutors, criminals, potential criminals, 
spectators in court, the public who read trial accounts, the spectators at executions, 
the children who lisped the oral tradition of criminal and legal folklore. To the 
lawyer, who asks what possible use such an endeavour may be, or even to a 
legal historian who knows how much doctrinal history is yet unwritten, such 
projects may appear to confuse the central with the peripheral, to exemplify 
perverse antiquarianism. Some take the view. that what 90 per cent. of the 
population thought about the law, or did with it, is unproblematic or 
uninteresting. When those dead men and women are invoked, it_ is as past 
"public opinion" or "the people," shades who·live in limbo, like those other 
unfortunate souls, the passengers on the phantom omnibus which never gets to 
Clapham. 
I have argued instead that popular beliefs are important to any convincing 
history of past criminal law, even in some of its more detailed doctrinal 
history. Social historians start from an assumption that past societies (and 
present ones) are complex places in which apparently unrelated social orders 
on closer inspection may show a remarkable interdependence. The connections 
may be circuitous, but because they are not immediately evident does not 
mean that they are not important. Tracing complex chains of causation, finding 
unsuspected connections, and revealing unspoken (or at least, privileged) values 
and decisions, in specific detail, is part of the historian's task. Our approach to 
the courts and their decisions, and to all those involved in the administration of 
justice is no different, whatever our theoretical perspectives. 
Such an approach seems perverse to some lawyers because it contradicts 
their own working premisses. I would reply that those premisses subvert 
historical explanation. At the risk of constructing an hypostatised English 
lawyer who never existed. I want to suggest some characteristics of legal 
scholarship which, if transposed to study of the past, would generate histories 
without depth or process. Our lawyer's handicap can be grouped under two 
heads: thinking like a lawyer, and doing so in England. 
By ''thinking like a lawyer" I mean certain intellectual  habits which are 
purposefully honed in the course of most legal education and practice, but 
which vitiate historical explanation. It is perhaps most convenient to list the 
errors in historical logic that seem likely to result from each.27 Five stand out; 
some are more common to the arts of advocacy, some to doctrinal analysis in 
the library. 
One to which I have made reference already is the fallacy of moralism. It is 
implicit in any unexamined assumption that state law inscribed a moral 
consensus, perhaps imperfect, but  roughly  the same in most social classes for 
most of the recent past. Yet it is instructive to consider why most historians (of 
at least this century) have been wary of using such assumptions to ground 
explanation. They are acutely conscious that their own values are highly 
contingent on culture and epoch, and are no guide to explaining the past. The 
point is a truism, even if in practice the boundaries between the theory one 
inevitably brings to research, and the personal reactions to what one finds, have 
a common plane. But a corollary is that in historical explanation there can be no 
privileged actors, whose values can be assumed, or dismissed, because they do 
or do not appear to coincide with one's own, or a postulated consensus. 
All this becomes more difficult to remember if the subject is crime, and 
if the social actors are rioters and burglars as well as judges and victims. An 
attempt to explain the values and acts of each in equally neutral or sympathetic 
terms may seem, to a lawyer, presumptuous and wrong, because it entails an 
uncommitted consideration of the meanings and uses of legal institutions. It has 
been argued that for those trained in the law, the legal order becomes 
ideology, that "law, and within it jurisprudence, constitutes 'a world · of its own'-
which the inquirer who takes legal norms, as such, as object of knowledge, 
cannot but inhabit and desire to serve."28 The assertion is undoubtedly cast in 
too absolute terms. But when the historian who approaches the criminal law as an 
object of knowledge encounters the assumption that because state law is an 
unqualified human good, its victims are self-evidently beneath serious 
consideration, he suspects the moralistic fallacy on the grand scale. 
Presentism,  the fallacy of working from present concerns to past origins, is 
anathema to historians,  but necessarily half  the lawyer's method.29 Whatever its 
merits in finding supporting arguments for a brief, it has the effect in historical 
work of writing out of the past any developments which did not survive in much 
the same form into the present. Since there is little in human affairs that did so, 
not even sex and hunger, it is disastrous as an intellectual method for recovering 
the past. In search of origins, it tends to find false analogies which, when 
stripped of context, can be made to look like their putative descendants. Where the 
object of knowledge has few recognisable descendants, the search does not even 
begin. Presumably that may explain (to take one example) why so little has been 
written about the wider effects of the purposeful extinction, through parliamentary 
enclosure Acts, of a great corpus of customary law in England over the last three 
centuries, a change which has changed the meaning in England of law itself.30 
The fallacy of identity appears likely to be a particular affliction of lawyers 
looking at history. Training to demonstrate legal consequences from legal 
causes entails the necessary assumption that legal effects usually have legal 
causes, or at least that those are the main causes worth considering. It is a 
presumption that must be immensely strengthened by the persuasive evidence 
for some autonomy of law. and legal culture from wider social forces. But the 
form of doctrinal debate is (to an historian) a pervasive form of mono-causal 
explanation, in which the question of autonomy and its degree are not even 
raised because the answer is assumed: new law largely is considered in 
terms of the working-out of implications of old law, and awkward cases tend 
to be dismissed as a residual term, rather than explained. Historians are 
sometimes surprised to see such cases (and legislation) smoothly accommodated 
in accounts in the doctrinal tradition. It may make them wonder if the best 
efforts of the other profession are not often put to reconciling differences which 
in other disciplines would call for explanation rather than reconciliation. 
The assumption of legal autonomy is often closely allied to a rationalist 
view of legal decision-making again conditioned by reliance on a narrow range 
of sources. This, like many of the other points that occur to an historian 
about legal reasoning, was one of the concerns of the legal realists, but some of 
their initiatives were doomed to inconclusive results. When they tried to analyse 
contemporary law the attempt was sure to be only marginally successful, 
particularly in studies of judicial decision-making, for two good reasons. One 
(as the reviewer of a recent biography of Frankfurter has pointed out) was 
that they were themselves insiders.31 Too rigorous an application of realist 
criticism could be construed as unseemly, impertinent personal criticism of 
colleagues with whom the rest of their professional lives were spent. More 
important was the fact that they could not read the private papers of their 
subjects. Short of the confessional (and one suspects that some judges in the 
confessional are as aware of exclusionary· rules there as in their 
courtrooms), private correspondence, notably correspondence meant to be kept 
private, is a prime source from which historians (including realists) have 
considered the levels of overt intention, collective assumptions, class bias, 
and professional learning (not necessarily in that order) which a bench brings to 
a case, or an Attorney-General brings to a prosecution. 32 Analysis begins there, 
since the exercise of power is often a profoundly calculated act, and where it 
is not consciously so calculated it is enacted within a medium of often 
unspoken but nonetheless powerful assumptions. Those assumptions include 
implicit judgments about "proper behaviour" resting on class, interest and 
ethnicity. Such assumptions often remain unexpressed, either because  they 
are unacceptable  within  the wider political culture, or simply in the belief that 
knowledge is often best kept back from most people for their own good. (It is 
very easy to make that rationalisation if that good is equated with the smooth 
operation of the instruments of government, or the administration of justice. )33 
They are particularly likely to remain unexpressed by the bench, as irrelevant 
to the issue, if the dominant style of legal judgments is narrowly formalist, as 
it has been in this country for well over a hundred years. In that case, as Atiyah 
suggests to us, we . may be obliged to watch for instances in which judges "give 
them- selves away" and reveal values, even unconscious influences, which help 
them to a decision but which are concealed thereafter in the language of pure 
doctrine.34 
Finally, much legal reasoning is dichotomous, which in historical work can 
easily lead to false dichotomous questions. It seems a likely consequence of 
viewing life in terms of what can be litigated, if not in the logic of law itself.35 
David Hume pointed out that to move from arbitration to litigation was to 
redefine the problem, and the solution: 
"Hence it is, that in references, where the consent of the parties leave the 
referees entire masters of the subject, they commonly discover so much 
equity and justice on both sides, as induces them to strike a medium, and 
divide the difference betwixt the parties. Civil judges, who have not this 
liberty, but are oblig'd to give a decisive sentence on some one side, are 
often at a loss how to determine, and are necessitated to proceed on the 
most frivolous reasons in the world. Half rights and obligations, which 
seem so natural in common life, are perfect absurdities in their tribunal; 
for which reason they are often oblig'd to take half arguments for whole 
ones, in order to terminate the affair one way or another."36 
Shared rights and obligations-"so natural in common life"-have found little 
support in English courts in recent centuries (although divided ones, of course, 
have.) The paradigm of litigation has tended to support a strong bias toward 
an individualist interpretation of what are collective interests.37 When such 
conflicts are mediated through criminal law, as they often have been in the 
English past, then collective responses can appear, in insufficiently sensitive 
legal accounts, as individual acts of deviation from an already assumed social 
norm. This configuration of the two assumptions of a societal consensus and 
individualist actors, orchestrated in the trial, is also a powerful reinforcement 
(in criminal law) of the moralistic fallacy. Moreover, when carried into an 
analysis of the social significance of the criminal law, dichotomous reasoning 
leads to false questions. Was the criminal law a generator of social symbols, 
or a service institution for the prosecution of crime? Did the criminal law 
promote specific class interests or was it used by all social classes? Were rules 
real constraints on judges or were they aspects of an orchestrated ideology 
of justice? For the eighteenth century, the answer in each case is "both," 
and it is that multiplicity which constitutes much of the significance of law.38 
Any scholar from another discipline, particularly those which try to view 
societies in the round, will compile her own list of what appear (from such a 
perspective) to be idiosyncrasies of legal reasoning. But I think they will often 
in the end lead to two central tenets:  that state law has both matched  an 
unproblematic  social consensus and has exhibited a logic largely independent 
of context, particularly that of economic and class interest. We are told that 
it is sensitively autonomous. I suggested earlier that in fact the legitimacy 
and authority of the criminal law are often inferred from an 
undemonstrated social consensus, and some accounts of the legal past 
tend to import equally undemonstrate assumptions of autonomy. Robert 
Gordon has suggested that that is why traditional legal scholarship tends to 
be highly suspicious of history in the sense in which historians tout court-
practice it: that is, of history without a prefix, committed to the 
understanding of the relationships of all social belief and practice. Historians 
propose to test the autonomy of the law in precisely the way they test the 
autonomy of other social orders, such as religious beliefs, economic 
organisation, class division-by looking purposefully for interrelations, in 
specific detail, in the minds and institutions they jointly form. Gordon 
argues that legal scholarship, at least in America, responds by employing a 
battery of intellectual stratagems to resist any recognition of the historical 
contingency of law. 9 
But I suggested earlier that if an ahistorical consciousness might be an 
expected result of lawyerly habits of thought, it also, at least in this country, 
has indigenous causes peculiar to England. By that I meant two things. 
The first is that the common-law tradition is so broad a part of the 
constitutional and cultural foundations of this country that there are a host of 
intimate relations between popular norms and state law, and have been for many 
centuries. At least in the past, the connections do not amount to anything like 
the "autonomous but sensitive" criminal law which is often proposed to us. The 
social history of the criminal law shows that the relationship was instead 
contradictory, shot through  with  collective values  opposed  to state law, 
popular celebration  of  old law which  the state was bent  on purging,  and 
usually  a  massive  avoidance  of  the  state  legal  apparatus  on  the grounds  that  
it was  both  financially  rapacious  and  unpredictable. Nonetheless, when 
centralised state law is so powerful and so visible, even in limited contexts, from 
so early a date in the history of the kingdom, it is easy to make a premature 
identification of state law and  popular  mores.  That  kind  of  oversimplification  
is less likely when  English  law  is  found  in  a  context  where  elite  
perceptions cannot be directly identified with national culture, in law or other 
areas. The extreme case is that of the Third World, where the abrupt intrusion  of  
English  and  other  European  law  has  done  much  to develop  paradigms  of  
imposed  law  and  legal  pluralism,   and  a sensitivity to the concealed and overt 
class strategies encapsulated in law.40   But  even  in  countries  where  the  
common  law  inheritance bulked  much  larger in the foundations of the 
national culture, the assumption of an identity of state law and social norms is 
less likely than in England to be an immediate one. 
In Canada, the example I know best, encomiums to the tradition of English 
law are a staple of formal occasions, and have been ever since underemployed  
English  barristers  and  solicitors,  or  refugee Loyalist Americans, began 
reconstructing English criminal law and practice in eighteenth-century Nova 
Scotia or Upper Canada. But in Quebec, English criminal law was also the 
imposition of the English conqueror in 1764 (for reasons of state justified  in 
terms of benevolence) on a population which was 96 per cent. French-speaking 
and accustomed  to Colbert's Ordinance of  1670.41  They also learned, as Lord 
Devlin pointed out on another occasion, that it was often the "second-rate"  and  
"the  blimps"  from  England  who  brought  the common  law  to  the  colonies.42   
More  important,  when  they  used legal arguments resting on English  and 
Imperial precedents,  in the cause of self-government, the English response was 
not congratulation  but   repression:   charges  of   sedition,  imprisonment   
without recourse to habeas corpus, and within another generation the bloody 
military  suppression  of  an  armed  populist  insurrection  in  which French and 
Irish nationalist lawyers figured prominently  as leaders. The Canadian public 
prosecutorial tradition also exhibits an interesting mix of traditions, one of them 
being the Imperial interest in maintaining direct colonial rule from London.43 
The contribution of Scots law is probably important here too, and perhaps also 
Dublin Castle's highly centralised prosecutorial system which (like its police) was 
in Ireland an outcome of the determination of the British state to maintain its 
rule in the face of a greatly rebellious population. 44 If some of its emigrant 
lawyers probably helped to found a system of prosecution in Canada with some 
similarities, other Irishmen and women carried their traditions of resistance with 
them. Undoubtedly the most notorious criminal episode in Canadian history, that 
of the Donnellys, had roots in blood feud endemic in those parts of Irish society 
in which the state's courts were avoided like the plague, and perhaps also from 
the immigrant experience in England, where Irish prisoners got short shrift from 
judges in the eighteenth century, and where Irishmen were the most prominent 
group involved in mutual physical violence with the "new" nineteenth-century 
police. 
The American influence (about which we have, typically, ambivalent feelings) 
is a conflict of influences. While English law and government in Canada for 
much of the !first century after 1776 were devoted  to  extirpating  republican   
and  democratic  constitutional heresy whenever it raised its head, and 
respectable opinion com-monly attributed crime to contamination from the same 
source (and sometimes still does), in late years American influence has affected 
our view of civil liberties. Once it was based squarely enough on principles 
within the English tradition (although sometimes reflecting a distinct cultural clash 
between the working assumptions of French and English-speaking justices in the 
Supreme Court).45 But now widespread popular views of police and criminal law 
in Canada owe much to the American mass media, and at a legislative level 
may have more than a little to do with our recent enthusiasm for Bills of 
Rights.46 
Finally, all students of our Supreme Court and our constitution are aware that 
some very particular (and occasionally peculiar) conceptions of Canadian 
society, politics, and federalist imperatives were to be found in the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council, before it ceased to be our final court of 
appeal in 1949. The experience of having a crippled domestic court which was 
constantly bypassed for recourse to a body in London which decided crucial 
constitutional issues, often in a single day and without written briefs, is an 
important constituent of our experience of disjunctions between "law"  and  
"society."47 
I  have  trespassed  on  your  hospitality  enough,  and  I  shall  not sketch  the  
Amerindian,  Scandinavian,  German,  Italian,  or  Douk- habour  cultural 
memories which might  further condition Canadian perceptions.  (Nor can I.) But 
I hope I have said enough to suggest why  Canadian  historians  perhaps  are less 
sure than  their  English counterparts that the criminal law (or other state law) 
reflects in an _ unproblematic way the wider values in the past society. We are 
more apt to be aware of legal transplants, imposition of law, recourse to martial 
law, and the slow and contradictory way in which English law became part of 
our national culture. The Third World experience, while  extreme,  is not wholly  
alien  to us.  But  neither  am  I convinced (and this is the point which prompted 
my excursion into chauvinist display) that criminal law in England has always 
exhibited quite so simple a relationship with cultural norms as seems sometimes to 
be supposed by her lawyers. 
One reason is the issue of social class, which has been of central interest to 
social historians. In the New World, social class and race and ethnicity have 
often been powerful reinforcing identities. But class divisions (and ethnic and 
racial ones) have not been unknown in England. It seems curious that the 
subject so rarely has appeared (I shall note a few significant exceptions) in the 
larger scholarship of English law, when it is (if an outsider may say so) so 
striking  a constituent  of  everything  English  from  education  to  health  care, 
from the national sense of humour to the temper of academic life. The 
remarkable reticence among lawyers on the subject may not be unrelated to those 
aspects of legal reasoning which I suggested help sustain professional belief in the 
apolitical autonomy of law and the dangerous irrelevance of social inquiry to most 
legal pursuits. But perhaps there are other reasons too, for it was not always 
thus. A scholar in Great Britain could once address his students in juris- 
prudence in the following terms without provoking (as it might in the more 
ideological climate of the early 1980s) loud denunciations of bias in education: 
". . . when . . . some have great wealth and others nothing, it is necessary 
that the arm of authority should be continually stretched forth, and 
permanent laws or regulation made which may protect the property of the 
rich from the inroads of the poor . . . Laws and governments may be 
considered in this and in every case as a combination of the rich to oppress 
.the poor, and preserve to themselves the inequality of the goods which 
would otherwise be soon destroyed by the attacks of the poor, who if not 
hindered by the government would soon reduce the others to an equality 
with themselves by open violence. "48 
This quotation, well known only since 1978, is from Adam Smith’s lectures on 
jurisprudence in the University of Glasgow in the 1750s and 1760s. It is his 
principal characterisation of the state of the. law in the second, pastoral stage of 
an evolutionary model of law and society. As Peter Stein and others have 
argued, Smith's explanation of social and legal change, while related to the natural 
law tradition, was based in large part on what he believed was an empirical base 
of observation or informed conjecture about the actions of men and women, 
spontaneous or modified by custom, habit, culture: education, or vested 
interest.49 But at base was economic reality, and, as he made clear in this 
passage-"in this and in every case"-Smith was convinced that much of the law 
of his own society was also "a combination of the rich to oppress the poor. . . 
." His division of society into those two elements was a staple of eighteenth-
century usage-the poor being the labouring poor, which contemporaries 
estimated to be at least half the population. 50 The social analysis of the larger 
purposes of law was an equally common element of the "philosophical historians" 
of the Scottish enlightenment. If the passage now brings to mind Marx rather than 
a "sound" British tradition, it may be, if I read Stein correctly, that the indigenous 
development of a jurisprudence grounded in social observation and analysis of 
interests and classes was short lived, at least in part for ideological reasons of a 
kind not entirely unfamiliar to us today. 
For Smith's observation and his larger approach to law could have a different 
significance in different hands, and in different circumstances. The prime 
instance was Smith's disciple, James Millar, who took the social and legal theory 
of the Scottish enlightenment to its most advanced point. Although no radical 
democrat, being an advanced Whig was enough, by the 1790s, to ensure that his 
theories would alarm Tories, one of whom 'once denounced his "democratical 
principles, and that sceptical philosophy which young noblemen and gentlemen of 
legislative rank carried into the world with them from his law-class, and . . . 
displayed with popular zeal, to the no small danger of perversion to all those 
under their influence. "51 An analysis which distinguished different interests in 
society, and contested an aristocratic hegemony in government (at a point when 
that influence was stronger than any time earlier in the century) was uncomfortable. 
At a time when the ideologues of the status quo fought Jacobinism by 
emphasising the blindness of English law to social division, having a "sceptical" 
law professor do the opposite was deeply disturbing. 
England's upper-class political culture was profoundly anti-Revolutionary during 
the French wars and for decades thereafter, and it was in that period that Smith 
and Millar's project of historical social inquiry in law was abandoned.52  If there is a 
connection, we do not . yet  understand  its  dimensions.  But  when  an  historical  
school  of jurisprudence  once again became significant in Britain, it was anodyne 
in its analysis and conservative in tendency,  using history to oppose a reform 
movement  identified with Benthamism.  Its inspiration was Savigny, in whose 
work there is no hint of class, but an evocation  of  law as the spirit of Nation  
and People.  History  was appealed to in the unspecific and comforting terms which 
Burke had made familiar  to Tory  English  gentlemen,  as an  argumentum  ad 
antiquitam.  Savigny's  own  work  was  strongly  conditioned  by  its conservative 
political  significance  for  Germany; it was embraced, with that of Blackstone and 
Burke, as the instinctive way to think about the history of English law.53 
I shall take the word of other scholars for the fact that Maine and others 
swallowed that tradition of universalism, and undifferentiated social wisdom of 
law, outside any social analysis. (For Maine, classes existed perhaps in ancient 
Rome, but not in England--or, at least, the virtual absence of British references 
in his work made it unnecessary to consider the issue).s4 The great emphasis 
on the medieval period which henceforth characterised legal writing on the 
history of law, and the abandonment of social inquiry in much professional 
history, also  helped to disinfest the history of law of a social analysis. Where it 
survived, it was as subtext. 
An instance was Sir James Fitzjames Stephen. He may hardly be taken as a 
typical English lawyer, which is perhaps why he was also the one who wrote 
the last extensive treatment of the history of criminal law in England until 
the mid-twentieth century.s6 He was an indefatigable propagandist and 
controversialist, as well as lawyer, historian, and judge. But undoubtedly one 
thing that attracted him to the study of criminal law was his deep interest in the 
issue of class politics in England. He was convinced that man's innate capacity 
for evil had been dangerously inflamed in the working class. They had been 
absurdly flattered by advanced democratic theorists and corrupted by 
irresponsible novelists like Dickens. England, in short, faced great danger 
from an ignorant and levelling democracy, and Stephen thought it only a 
matter of time before the disaster of the universal franchise became a reality. 
In such circumstances the criminal law, although so heavy an engine of social 
ordering that it should never be used lightly, was absolutely indispensable. A 
strong and enlightened leadership from men of the higher and professional 
classes (and Stephen undoubtedly saw himself as one such) could be expected to 
use it with care and discretion and, where necessary, harsh effectiveness. 
Criminal law was of political significance, in the widest sense. s7 
But Stephen was also writing within the tradition of legal evolutionism 
shared by his friend Henry Maine, and probably at its height. There was a 
marked equivocation in Stephen's treatment of the relationship of the criminal 
law to wider social norms. On the one hand, he argued in defence of legislation 
for morals that there was a general social consensus on the boundaries of good 
and evil, for which the criminal law was (where its standard of proof reached) an 
effective expression: "the ratio ultima of the majority against persons who its 
application assumes to have renounced the common bonds which connect men 
together. "s9 But the highest efficacy of the law is not simply that it expresses 
such moral majoritarian sentiments-that it gives effect to predominant 
opinion, especially with respect to the most serious crimes-but that it shapes 
that opinion, and can help create normative majorities, if used with care: 
"Even indifferent or virtuous acts will come to be condemned by the moral 
sentiment of particular times and places, if the law condemns them."60 At 
many points in Stephen’s treatment, tens ions  of that kind, arising largely 
from the possibility of different class perceptions of The Good, lead him to-
write a more rounded account of the law than any doctrinal exposition 
could be. He emphasised, for instance, that prosecution conducted in the 
form of private litigation also immensely strengthened the capacity of the 
criminal law to teach moral lessons in a theatrical setting. To contemporary 
suggestions that the English prosecutorial system was inefficient, he replied 
that that was a necessary price to pay for the legitimacy that the mode of 
prosecution conferred on the criminal law, and on the constitution, as a 
whole. An efficient prosecution in the hands of the state could too easily 
(even if wrongly) be identified with tyranny. The criminal law's great capacity 
for obtaining consent to the social order should never be sacrificed to lesser 
goals.61 
Stephen shared a belief of many social historians now studying the eighteenth 
and nineteenth century that "the administration of criminal justice is the 
commonest, the most striking, and the most interesting shape, in which the 
sovereign power of the state manifests itself to the great bulk of its subjects." If 
that was one aspect of its importance, for Stephen there was another: English 
criminal procedure channelled popular passions into safe ends, inculcated virtue,_ 
and taught a working class dangerously close to revolution "to regard the 
Government  as their friend . . . ."62 
v 
My purpose here, and throughout, should not be misunderstood. It is not to 
say that the Scottish philosophical historians, or Stephen, argued that the 
doctrines and institutions of the criminal law, or all law, could be understood 
only or even primarily in terms of a wider social analysis. I have mentioned them 
for two reasons. The passages I have quoted contrast with many nineteenth 
century (and twentieth century) accounts of law which assumed rather than 
demonstrated the substantial identity of law and social consensus, an identification 
which I have suggested may still be one of the larger background ideas of 
much traditional legal scholarship, if rarely articulated  in explicit terms. 
Secondly, and more important, they may help to explain to lawyers the interests of 
social historians now studying how the criminal law worked in that same period 
(roughly 1760 to 1860). 
Adam  Smith  and  Sir  James  Fitzjames  Stephen  were  fascinated observers of 
their own societies,63 and they were convinced that the criminal law was a central 
nexus of its class divisions, and helped to sustain them. Their expression of that 
conviction, however foreign to the style of much legal scholarship, is abundantly 
familiar in tone to historians examining popular and elite opinion in that period. 
And like Smith and Stephen, when we study the place of the criminal law in 
Hanoverian and early Victorian society in daily life as well as opinion, we encounter 
the issues of class, contested norms, and their problematic relationship to the 
coercive power of an undemocratic state. Those issues demand exploration, 
particularly of a social institution which avows that it transcends substantive 
social inequality. 
In this century, Adam Smith's tradition of social inquiry has been resuscitated 
in some areas of legal scholarship. Journals devoted to exploring the law with 
the tools of social science-the inheritors of the realist programme -- or from 
more radical theoretical perspectives, have established beachheads (I am told) 
in academic law. But I am also told by its practitioners that the enterprise is 
regarded as one of marginal interest by most of their colleagues. Some even 
attribute to it sinister purposes. 64 I hope I have explained why social historians 
think an uncommitted exploration of the social functions of law to be important. 
But we too are aware of a degree of wariness among the lawyers. In the fable 
with which I began, there was one last warning given to the historian before 
he went off to tunnel through the strata of legal manuscripts. In solemn tones, 
the lawyer gave him formal notice: "Do no environmental damage. We take 
conservation of the Law Mountains very seriously indeed." 
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